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BOOK REVIEWS

PARALLEL THINKING
Hore, Peter, ed. The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold War. Maritime Strategic Studies
Institute Paper 2, March 1999. 109pp.

Over the past decade, the U.S. Navy has
undergone a profound shift in its strategy
and thinking. This collection of thoughtful essays written by senior Royal Navy
officers between 1992 and 1998 makes it
clear that soul-searching by naval thinkers has not been confined to the United
States. Eric Grove’s foreword, tracing the
evolution of British naval thought over
this period, and Captain Edwin Atkinson’s
essay, “The Influence of Sea Power upon
Peace,” demonstrate how closely the
thinking, assessments, and recommendations being made in the United Kingdom
paralleled those made in the U.S. Navy’s
“. . . From the Sea” process. It is certainly
an interesting commentary on the eternal
verities of naval thinking that what Grove
calls an “intellectual revolution” occurred
without any formal exchange between
these two very different groups, each of
which was engaged in an “in house” effort.
The real value of these essays, however,
lies not in the history of post–Cold War
naval thought but in what they say about
a continuing revolution in naval thinking
on both sides of the Atlantic—especially
the efforts to stretch declining force levels
to deal with extended commitments. A
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particularly salient essay in this regard is
Vice Admiral Alan West’s “1919–1991:
The Need for a United Kingdom Grand
Strategy.” West’s forthright analysis of
Britain’s failed attempt to adapt to a new
strategic environment after World War I
points to the lack of a coherent national
“grand” strategy, to destructive
interservice rivalries, and to military
planning driven by costs alone. The lack
of a grand strategy in particular left Britain unable to make any meaningful
trade-off between the limited means accorded the military in the interwar years
and the far-reaching commitments that
British forces were directed to meet.
Compounding the problem was the policy makers’ assumption that Britain “will
not be engaged in any great war during
the next ten years,” a fiscally convenient
dictum that persisted well into the 1930s
despite evidence to the contrary and that
ultimately left Britain unprepared for
war. All of this should have a familiar
ring to today’s readers. Indeed, it is the
currency of these problems that gives this
essay its greatest impact.
Of equal, if different, significance is a series of essays by Brigadier Robert Fry,
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Vice Admiral J. J. Blackham, and Admiral
Sir Peter Abbott, written between 1995
and 1998. These provide perceptive British insights on the changing maritime
dimension of our post–Cold War world
and the increased roles for maneuvers
and forward presence in shaping a new
strategic environment. These are exactly
the kinds of issues with which the U.S.
armed forces are now struggling.

Berkowitz, Bruce D., and Allan E. Goodman. Best
Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2000. 203pp. $22.50

The U.S. intelligence community, as it
currently exists, is fundamentally flawed
and must be remade. With this opening
premise, Bruce Berkowitz, a senior consultant at RAND Corporation, and Allan
Goodman, former dean of the
The essays’ chief drawbacks are their
brevity and what they do not say. The in- Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service, present their bluereviewer occupies a position of special re- print for the future of American intelligence.

A book
sponsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in
context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a
heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge
with reason and consistency.

According to the authors, a
trio of factors threatens to
leave the intelligence community ineffective and irrelevant.
First, it is no revelation that
ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER
the end of the Cold War has
left the intelligence commusights presented are clearly worthwhile
nity without a single clear threat as a foand for that very reason deserve expancus for its analytic efforts. The past
sion. For example, what were the workemphasis on the Soviet Union offered ining-level debates that undergirded the
telligence analysts historical continuity.
flag officers’ presentations? The fact that
Change tended to be evolutionary; for
the essays cover the seven-year period up
example, one generation of Soviet subto only three years ago would indicate
marines offered insights into the next.
that the issues raised with regard to the
Today, however, nations and nonstate
changing role of naval forces in the new
actors have unprecedented access to
century are still as far from being fully re- technology and information and with it a
solved in the Royal Navy as they are in
new capability to organize and operate
the U.S. naval service. This suggests room rapidly across borders. These developfor both an equivalent American publica- ments create the prospect of an “instantion and another Maritime Strategic
taneous threat” against the United States
Studies Institute paper, as both navies
from entirely unexpected sources.
continue the process of rethinking naval
Second, if Carl von Clausewitz was corpower that collectively began in 1991.
rect in defining intelligence as “every sort
EDWARD A. SMITH, JR.
of information about the enemy and his
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
country,” fundamental changes in inforWashington Studies and Analysis
mation management must create fundaThe Boeing Company
Arlington, Virginia
mental changes in intelligence. Berkowitz
and Goodman observe that the intelligence community was created on an
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